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BOOSEY & HAWKES MUSIC PUBLISHING LTD.
V.
THE WALT DISNEY CO.
145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
INTRODUCTION

In 1993, Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers ("Boosey"), an
English corporation that owns the rights to Igor Stravinsky's
composition "The Rite of Spring," brought an action against the
Walt Disney Company ("Disney")', in connection with Disney's
2 Boosey is the assignee of
foreign distribution of the film Fantasia.
Igor Stravinsky's "The Rite of Spring", a composition featured in
the Disney animated film Fantasia.
Boosey contended
Stravinsky's 1939 license to Disney, which authorized the use and
distribution of "The Rite of Spring" in Fantasia,did not authorize
its distribution in video format.4 The District Court granted partial
summary judgment to Boosey, holding the 1939 license agreement
did not authorize a video format release of the motion picture.' The
lower court also granted partial summary judgment to Disney,
dismissing Boosey's claims of breach of contract with respect to
the license; violations of the Lanham Act §43(a); and foreign
copyright infringement.6 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's holding with respect to Boosey's
Lanham Act claims, but vacated the judgments on the license
agreement and foreign copyright violations.7

1. Id. Buena Vista Home Video, a Disney affiliate, was also named as a
defendant. Collectively, both defendants are referred to as "Disney."
2. Id. at 485.
3. Id. at 483.
4. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 483-4.
5. Id. at 484.

6. Id.
7. Id.
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FACTS

The Walt Disney film Fantasia (hereinafter "the film" or "the
motion picture") was released in 1940.8 The film contains no
dialogue, but pairs animated creatures, such as Mickey Mouse,
with passages of celebrated classical music.9 The soundtrack
includes compositions by Bach, Beethoven, Schubert, Tchaikovsky
and Stravinsky, all performed by the Philadelphia Orchestra."0
A. The 1939 Agreement
In 1938, Disney sought Stravinsky's authorization to use "The
Rite of Spring" in the film." No permission was required to record
or distribute the composition in the United States because the work
was deemed in the United States' public domain; however,
authorization was required for distribution in foreign countries
where Stravinsky enjoyed copyright protection. 2 In 1939, Disney
and Stravinsky' 3 executed an agreement ("the 1939 Agreement")
granting Disney the right to use Stravinsky's composition in
exchange for a six thousand dollar fee. 4
The 1939 Agreement granted Disney "the nonexclusive,
irrevocable right, license, privilege and authority to record in any
manner, medium or form, and to license the performance of, the
musical composition... "" The pertinent paragraphs of the license
agreement are as follows: Paragraph Three of the Agreement
specified:
The music of said musical composition may be used
in one motion picture throughout the length thereof
or through such portion or portions thereof as the
Purchaser shall desire. The said music may be used
8. Id.
9. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 484.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id. Under United States law, "The Rite of Spring" was deemed in the
public domain.
13. Id. at 483.
14. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 484.
15. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/8
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in whole or in part and may be adapted, changed,
added to or subtracted from, all as shall appear
desirable to the Purchaser in its uncontrolled
discretion. 6

Paragraph Four provided the license is "limited to the use of the
composition in synchronism or timed-relation with the motion
picture. "" Paragraph Five specified that the right to record the
composition is conditioned upon its performance in theaters with
valid licenses from the American Society of Composers, Authors
& Publishers ("ASCAP"), or any other performing rights society
having jurisdiction in the territory in which the motion picture is
performed. 8 And Paragraph Seven provided "the licenser reserves
to himself all rights and uses in and to the said musical
composition not herein specifically granted."' 9
For more than five decades, Disney exhibited "The Rite of
Spring" in Fantasiaunder the 1939 Agreement.2" The film has
been re-released at least seven times since 1940.21 Neither Boosey
nor Stravinsky ever objected to any of these distributions.22
B. Fantasiaon Video
In 1991, Disney released a videotape version of Fantasia,which
was sold in the United States as well as foreign countries.23 In
16. Id. Paragraph Three further provides the title "The Rite of Spring" or "Le
Sacre de Printemps", or any other title, may be used as the title of said motion
picture, and Stravinsky's name may be announced in connection with the motion
picture. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 484. The Court referred to this as "The ASCAP Condition."
19. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 484.

20. Id. at 485.
21. Id. As it appears in the film soundtrack, The Rite of Spring was
shortened from its original thirty-four minutes to twenty-two and a half minutes,
and portions of the composition were reordered.
22. Id. Excerpts of Fantasia, including portions of "The Rite of Spring", have
been televised over the years, though never in its entirety.
23. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F. 3d at 485. The Fantasia video release has
generated more than three hundred sixty million dollars in gross revenue for
Disney.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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1993, Boosey filed a complaint against Disney, seeking: 1) a
declaratory judgment that the 1939 Agreement did not include
Disney's rights to use Stravinsky's composition in video format; 2)
damages under the Lanham Act for Disney's false designation of
origin and misrepresentation, due to Disney's alteration of the
work; 3) damages for copyright infringement in at least eighteen
different foreign countries; 4) damages for breach of contract of the
1939 Agreement; and 5) damages for unjust enrichment."
After cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court
dismissed Boosey's breach of contract claim, finding Disney had
discharged its only contractual obligations by paying Stravinsky
the six thousand dollars.2 The court determined the language of
the 1939 Agreement, while giving Disney the broad right to record
"The Rite of Spring" in the film on video and laser disc, prevented
Disney from distributing video tapes or laser discs directly to
consumers under the ASCAP Condition.26 The District Court
dismissed Boosey's claim for damages under the Lanham Act,
concluding Boosey had failed to introduce evidence of actual
consumer confusion.27 With respect to Boosey's copyright claims,
Disney invoked the doctrine offorum non conveniens and the court
dismissed Boosey's claims because they involved the application
of foreign copyright law.28 Thus, the lower court's decision
declared Disney an infringer, but granted Boosey no relief, leaving
it free to sue in the various foreign countries under whose
copyright laws it claimed infringement. 9 Both parties timely
appealed the district court's decision.3"

24. Id. Boosey abandoned its unjust enrichment claim early in the litigation
and the issue was not raised on appeal.
25. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers Ltd v. The Walt Disney Company,
934 F. Supp. 119, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
26. Id. at 123.
27. Id. at 126.
28. Id. at 124-25.
29. Id. at 125.
30. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 485.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/8
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Scope of the 1939 Agreement
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Leval, began its
analysis with a discussion of contractual interpretation. First, the
court examined whether the 1939 Agreement allowed Disney to
distribute "The Rite of Spring" in video format, since the license
contained no express provision for "future technologies," and
because Stravinsky had reserved to himself all rights not granted in
the Agreement.3 Second, it examined whether Paragraph Five, the
ASCAP Condition, prevented Disney from distributing "The Rite
of Spring" directly to consumers.32
B. The Video Format
The Second Circuit found the language of the 1939 Agreement
broad enough to include Disney's distribution of the motion picture
in video format.33 The Agreement conveyed to Disney the right "to
record ["The Rite of Spring"] in any manner, medium or form" for
'
use "in a motion picture. 34
The court looked to whether the
license included a grant of rights which may be reasonably read to
5
3
cover new use.

31. Id. at 486. Disputes concerning licensee's rights to exploit licensed works
through new marketing channels made possible by technologies developed after
the licensing contract are frequently called "new use" problems. see 3 Melville
B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Section 10.10[A] at
10-86; see also Kirke La Shilte Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79,188
N.E. 163 (1933) (early case deciding whether a license for a stage production
also conveyed rights in a sound motion picture).
32. Id. at488.
33. Id. at 486.
34. Id.
35. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F. 3d at 486. (citing Bartsch v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc. 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Bloom v. Hearst
Entertainment Inc., 33 F.3d 518, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Bartsch to
hold a grant of movie and television rights to a book also encompassed video
rights).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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The Second Circuit relied on its previous decision in Bartsch v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,Inc.,36 which held that a license assigning
rights to the motion picture version of a musical play included the
right to televise the motion picture version of the play. Bartsch,
however, left open the question of foreseeability pertaining to the
new channels of distribution at the time of contracting.37 Judge
Leval noted not all Circuits are in accord on the issue of a license's
broad capacity to cover future developed markets resulting from
future technologies.38 Some circuits have found the license of
rights in a given medium (such as motion pictures) only includes
such uses as fall under the unambiguous core meaning of the term,
and exclude any uses that lie within the ambiguous penumbra (for
example, the exhibition of motion pictures on television).39 The
burden of excluding the right to a new use rests on the grantor, and
the court found no indication in the 1939 Agreement that such
rights should not be granted to Disney.4"
Further, the court found Disney proffered unrefutable evidence
that a nascent market for home video viewing of feature films
existed in 1939.41 While other circuits interpreting issues of new
use have construed such licenses in accordance with the purposes
of copyright law,42 Judge Leval based his opinion on neutral
principles of contract interpretation.43
Second Circuit precedent in Bartsch placed the burden of
framing an exception to a license on the grantor, but Judge Leval
36. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir.
1968).
37. Id.
38. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 486.
39. Id. see Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 853-54 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding license to use musical score in television production does
not extend to use in videocassette release); see also Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d
1379, 1390-91 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding license for television viewing did not
extend to videocassette release).
40. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 486.
41. Id.
42. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854; see also Jondora Music Publish. Co. v.
Melody Recordings, Inc. 506 F.2d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1974); Warner Bros.
Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1954).
43. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 487.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/8

6

Blaha: Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishing LTD. v. the Walt Disney Co. 145

1999]

BOOSEY & HAWKES V WALT DISNEY

455

did not interpret this as a default rule in favor of copyright
licensees.'
Judge Leval concluded the words of the contract
favored neither licensor nor licensee; the party seeking deviation or
exception from the meaning reasonably conveyed by the words of
the contract should bear the burden of negotiating for language
expressing that deviation.45 Thus, if Stravinsky, had wished to
exclude new markets arising from subsequently developed
technologies, he could have inserted such language of limitation
into the license.46
Judge Leval further noted that although contract interpretation
normally requires an inquiry into the intent of the contracting
parties, such an inquiry would not be helpful in this case.47 Many
years after the formation of the contract, it might be impossible to
consult the principals or retrieve documentary evidence to ascertain
the parties' intent with respect to new uses.48 Since evidence of
intent is likely to be both scant and unreliable, the Second Circuit
found the burden of justifying a departure from a reasonable
reading of the contract should fall on the party advocating
departure.49
Finally, Judge Leval stated the presence of the reservation clause
contributed nothing to the scope of the license, and merely
affirmed that Stravinsky retained what he had not given away."0
44. Id. The opinion notes that commentators and courts have misinterpreted
Bartsch as "pro licensee." see, e.g., Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426
F.Supp. 690, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); James W. Dabney, Licenses and New
Technology: Apportioning and Benefits, C674 ALI-ABA 85, 89, 96.
45. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 487.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 488. The court noted "intent is not likely to be helpful when the
subject of the inquiry is something the parties were not thinking about."
48. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 488.
49. Id. Leval bolstered this conclusion by pointing out policy concerns
justifying such a position. He noted construing new use problems against
licensees might lead to anti-progressive incentives. Producers might be reluctant
to explore innovative technologies for the exhibition of movies if the

consequence were they would lose their rights to exhibit the licensed works. Id.
at note 4. And Leval added holding contracting parties accountable to the
reasonable interpretation of their agreements encourages both licensors and

licensees to anticipate and bargain for the full value of potential future uses. Id.
50. Id. at488.
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The Second Circuit's "preferred approach" in analyzing new use
cases thus remains a "reasonable reading" of the language of the
contract, and the court affirmed the district court's holding that
Disney's license included the right to distribute Fantasiain video
format.51
C. The ASCAP Condition
Even if a reasonable reading in the broad language of the 1939
Agreement allowed Disney to distribute Fantasia on videotape,
Boosey contended the ASCAP Condition in the Agreement
expressly prohibited such distribution directly to consumers.52
Although the district court had granted summary judgment to
Boosey on this issue, the Second Circuit vacated its judgment,
53
holding the language of the ASCAP Condition facially unclear.
The terms of the ASCAP Condition allowed Disney the right to
record "The Rite of Spring" only "upon the performance of the...
work in theaters having ASCAP or similar licenses. ' Boosey
argued this condition precluded Disney from distributing the film
in video format.55 The Second Circuit read this language literally
as requiring no more of Disney than exposing the film in two or
more ASCAP-certified theaters, a condition surely satisfied long
ago.56 The court held the ASCAP Condition was ambiguous with
respect to prohibiting Disney from exhibiting Stravinsky's work in
non-ASCAP theaters, or from distributing the film directly to
57
consumers.
According to the Second Circuit, since "The Rite of Spring" was
in the public domain in the United States, the license pertained
only to foreign rights, which were described in the contract as
world-wide.58 Thus, to construe the ASCAP Condition as Boosey
suggested would mean the film was prohibited from being shown
51. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 488.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 489.
55. Id.
56. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 489.
57. Id.
58. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/8
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in any form in all countries where the work was protected and
theaters did not have ASCAP-like licenses.5 9 The court also relied
on a well-known treatise on music licensing, which described such
ASCAP clauses as "industry boilerplate," appearing in countless
licenses for American films.'
Interpreting the ASCAP clause
according to Boosey, studios with copyrighted works licensed with
such clauses would be completely prohibited from showing their
films at all in the United States if U.S. theaters ever ceased to use
ASCAP licenses.6 Judge Leval doubted the entire film industry
entered contracts placing it at the mercy of its licensers in case
ASCAP licensing were abandoned. 62 Further, Judge Leval noted
Boosey did not cite any court decisions confirming its view of the
ASCAP provision.63 The Second Circuit found neither party's
interpretation of the ASCAP clause compelling under the plain
terms of the provision; the court did find the condition facially
unclear, thereby justifying consideration of extrinsic evidence of
negotiations for the 1939 Agreement? 4
The court, however, did not find Boosey's extrinsic evidence
persuasive." Boosey argued Disney knew the 1939 Agreement
permitted distribution only to ASCAP-licensed theaters. In support
of this contention, Boosey pointed to several post-1939
negotiations between Disney and Boosey over whether Disney

59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Al Kohn and Bob Kohn, Kohn on Music Licensing, 838-40,
857-58 (2d ed. 1996)
61. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 489.

62. Id. Judge Leval added ASCAP licenses did indeed disappear from U.S.
theaters as a result of an antitrust ruling in 1948. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v.
ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 894-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
63. Id. The court also noted the Kohn treatise indicated the ASCAP condition
remained industry boilerplate until sometime in the 1950's. If this was true,
Leval stated, then Boosey's interpretation of the condition required the court to
believe that studios agreed to limit distribution of movies containing licensed
works to ASCAP-licensed theaters even after ASCAP licensing of theaters had

been declared unlawful. Leval found such a presumption "nonsensical" and
"unimaginable."

64. Id.
65. Id. at 490.
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could use sections of the composition.66 The Second Circuit found
none of these proposed uses involved the use of the musical
composition in "synchronism or timed-relation," as required by
Paragraph Four of the Agreement, and therefore were beyond its
67
scope.
Boosey also presented examples of similar contracts for other
compositions used in Fantasia, which contained the ASCAP
clauses that conditioned Disney's "right to license the
performance"; in Stravinsky's contract, Disney's "right to record"
was so conditioned (emphasis added).68 Boosey argued the drastic
limitation on rights demonstrated Stravinsky's bargaining for an
enhanced interest in Fantasia'scontinuing revenue stream.69 The
court found this point illusory, since "The Rite of Spring" was in
the public domain in the United States, and Disney did not need a
license to record the composition.7 °
The Second Circuit found neither the plain terms of the 1939
Agreement nor the "sparse and contradictory" evidence presented
could compel the conclusion that Disney's license was limited to
theatrical performances of "The Rite of Spring."" The court
vacated the summary grant of a declaratory judgment in Boosey's
favor, and remanded the issue to trial.72

66. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F. 3d at 490. All extrinsic evidence presented
was documentary, as no known witnesses to the negotiation of the 1939
Agreement had survived to the time of this litigation.
67. Id. In 1941, Disney acknowledged the Agreement did not license use of
The Rite of Spring on radio. In 1969, Disney negotiated and paid for the rights
to release the soundtrack recording of the Rite of Spring as part of a complete
Fantasia album. And in 1990, Disney unsuccessfully sought Boosey's
permission to use sections of the composition in a performance by Pink Floyd to
be filmed at the Great Pyramid at Giza.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Judge Leval even noted it was arguable the ASCAP Condition had
no functional significance at all, since the condition applied only to something
Disney had the right to do without Stravinsky's permission. Id. at 490-91.
71. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 491.
72. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/8
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D. Foreign Copyright
The Second Circuit next examined the District Court's
invocation of forum non conveniens with respect to Boosey's
copyright infringement claims.73 Judge Leval explained while
district courts enjoy broad discretion to decide whether to dismiss
an action under this doctrine,74 this discretion is still subject to
meaningful appellate review.'
The standard for granting a motion to dismiss under forum non
conveniens was established in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. 76 Gilbert
provided a two-step analysis: first, the court must determine
whether there exists an adequate forum with jurisdiction to hear the
case, and if so, then the court must weigh a balance of public and
private interests 77 to decide which formula will best serve the ends
ofjustice. 78 Applying this two-step analysis to Boosey, the Second
Circuit found the doctrine offorum non conveniens inappropriate
and reversed the District Court's ruling.79
Under the first prong of the test, the court found New York was
an adequate forum and had jurisdiction over the causes of action.8"
The Second Circuit noted the District Court had failed to consider
whether there were alternate fora capable of adjudicating Boosey's
claims,8" and made no determination that Disney was subject to
jurisdiction in the various countries where the court anticipated
trials would occur.82 Therefore, the District Court did not

73. Id.
74. Id. see also Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81
F.3d 1224, 1232 (2d Cir. 1996).
75. Id. at 491; see R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., Inc., 942 F.2d
164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991).
76. 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947).

77. Id. at 508.
78. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 491 (citing Peregrine Myanmar Ltd v.
Segal, 89 F.3d 41,46 (2d Cir. 1996). These interests may include the availability
of witnesses and evidence, the cost, and the spped with which litigation will
proceed.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 492.
81. Id. at 491.
82. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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condition its dismissal of Boosey's foreign copyright claims on
Disney's consent to jurisdiction in those foreign nations.83
The court found the second prong, balancing public and private
interests, also favored holding the trial in New York.84 With
respect to the private interests, the court concluded evidence and
witnesses were available for presentation in New York, and a trial
in that forum would proceed sooner, allowing the parties to sort out
their rights in a single proceeding. 5 The court did not view
Boosey's choice of forum to be motivated by harassment, and
further found that Disney's motion would complicate, delay, and
ultimately render the trial more expensive by splitting the suit into
eighteen parts in eighteen nations.8 6 Judge Leval also noted other
factors that weighed in favor of adjudicating the case in New York:
such as Disney being a United States corporation, the fact that the
1939 Agreement was substantially negotiated and signed in New
York, that the Agreement was governed by New York law, and the
trial was ready to proceed in New York.87 In sum, the court
vacated the forum non conveniens dismissal of Boosey's foreign
copyright claims and remanded the issue for trial in New York.88
E. Breach of Contract
Boosey also sought relief for Disney's breach of contract,
alleging the foreign release of Fantasiain video format violated
the 1939 Agreement. 9 The District Court had granted summary
judgment in favor of Disney on this claim, finding the Agreement
obligated Disney to do no more than pay six thousand dollars in

83. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 491.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The district court had concluded these foreign copyright claims
involved strong national interest best litigated in their respective countries.
Boosey & Hawkes, 934 F. Supp. at 124. The Second Circuit conceded that
reluctance to apply foreign law is a valid factor favoring dismissal under forum
non conveniens, but it alone does not justify dismissal. Boosey & Hawkes, 145
F.3d at 492.
87. Id.
88. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 492.
89. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/8
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consideration to Stravinsky. ° Because the Second Circuit had
already deemed the ASCAP Condition facially unclear, it did not
conclude as a matter of law that Disney had discharged all its
contractual obligations.91 If Boosey could prove the ASCAP
Condition contracted Disney to perform Fantasiaonly in theaters
with ASCAP licenses, then Boosey could indeed be entitled to
seek relief for a breach of that contract.92
F. The Lanhan Act
Finally, the court examined Boosey's claims for damages under
§43(a) of the Lanham Act,93 which alleged Disney misleadingly
represented Fantasiaas containing a "full and accurate" recording
of "The Rite of Spring," when in fact the composition was
shortened and edited. 94 To receive damages under the Lanham
Act, a plaintiff must prove either actual consumer confusion,
deception resulting from a violation of the Act, or that defendant's
actions were intentionally deceptive, giving rise to a rebuttable
presumption of consumer confusion. 95 The Second Circuit found
Boosey had proffered no evidence of actual confusion or
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Lanham Act §43(a) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ...uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
03) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person's goods, services or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a).
94. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 493.
95. Id. (citing George Basch C. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d

Cir. 1992)).
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intentional deception.96 The court noted Paragraph Three of the
Agreement gave Disney express authorization to represent to the
public that the composition as it appears in Fantasia is
Stravinsky's; 97 and Disney had represented it as such in countless
theatrical performances. 9 The court found no deception arose
simply from the video format release of the same composition in
the same film, and held Boosey waived any rights to a deception
claim. 99
CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Boosey, which contended Disney's foreign video format
market exceeded the terms of its 1939 license."° It vacated as well
the grant of summary judgment in favor of Disney, which had
dismissed Boosey's claim of breach of contract.'0 1 The court
reversed the District Court's dismissal of Boosey's foreign
copyright claims through forum non conveniens, °2 and affirmed
the District Court's dismissal of Boosey's Lanham Act claims. 3

Susan S. Blaha

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 493.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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